Every once in a while, somebody shoots their mouth off about the bad things that happen in our world. There were Robertson and Falwell opining that 9/11 was God's judgment on the gays, and John Hagee's statement that God willed the Holocaust in order to establish the State of Israel (which I blogged about here). Now we have John Piper declaring that God sent a tornado to Minneapolis to punish the Lutherans meeting there for ordaining gays (HT). Always the gays!
In one sense I don't have much to say about Piper that I didn't say about Hagee. Piper knows a bit too much about God's will; he collapses the distinction between providence and history, and reduces the hermeneutical circle to a point. Piper's statement is entirely consistent with a theology in which God ordains evil in order to be glorified through its punishment, and lucky for Piper that he's on God's side! He need not fear but only take grim satisfaction in all manner of "natural disasters" and "strange coincidences."
But between the Hagee post and today I took a seminar on Augustine, and my final paper was on Augustine's doctrine of evil. I focused on book seven of the Confessions, and then branched out from there to survey Augustine on "natural evil," and the origins of evil (God? The Free Will? Fallen Angels?) I'm going to re-post the last third of that paper here because, while Piper's statement is offensive, it doesn't come out of the blue, as you'll see if you have the patience to slog through it!
Last point before the paper--which I also left in the comment thread at Inhabitatio Dei. We would all do well to do less theorizing about the origin and meaning of evil, and do more practical work ameliorating its effects.
In sum, Augustine’s conviction that
evil is internal and insubstantial is the corollary of his confession that God
is good, omnipotent and immaterial. These twin beliefs represent a marked
departure from his earlier Manichean beliefs, that good and evil are
materialistic, dualistic principles whose warfare precipitated the world and
its mixture of good and evil. Both Nebridius and the Neo-Platonists helped free
Augustine’s theology from materialism, the former by undermining his faith in
astrology and a mutable God, and the latter by giving him an argument for evil
as insubstantial and a way to experience God as immaterial. Ultimately, the journey was one of spiritual
maturation, not just intellectual enlightenment. Augustine attributes his arrival at the Truth
and perseverance in it to the One who is Truth incarnate, Jesus Christ, whom
the pagans do not worship, the philosophers will not consent to learn from, and
whom the Manicheans have deeply misunderstood.
The one who humbled himself humbled the proud Augustine, rendering him
teachable and able to both see the light and abide in it.
While this paper has traced the
development of Augustine’s theodicy, some unanswered questions remain, and the
implications of his theodicy have yet to be fleshed out. To these concerns this paper now turns.
All things, to the extent that they
exist, are good. On this maxim Augustine’s doctrine of insubstantial evil
depends. All things? Even, say, a locust plague? And what of the goodness of good things, such
as the moon, for is it not of dubious character when compared to the surpassing
greatness of the sun? Perhaps God erred in denying to the moon the greatness of
the sun, and perhaps God erred in creating such wretched creatures as voracious
grasshoppers.
Augustine briefly responds to this
problem in Confessions VII: “In
some parts of it certain things are regarded as evil because they do not suit
certain others; but these same things do fit in elsewhere, and they are good
there, and good in themselves” (Conf. VII.13.19). The problem then, is
not with the creature itself, but with an imbalance in the relationship between
creatures. Locusts are good, but too many of them in one place may harm a wheat
field. So in locating evil in the state of balance between the creatures,
rather than in the creatures themselves, Augustine has yet again demonstrated
evil’s insubstantial nature.
In On Free Will, Augustine explains
what it means that things in themselves are good, and collectively, very
good. Rather than faulting the glory of
Thing X or God its Creator for not living up to the glory of Thing Y, one
should appreciate the role that Thing X plays in the glory of Thing Y by offering
itself to Thing Y by way of contrast:
For the earth
contains land of all kinds, passing by gradual stages from the most fruitful
and pleasant to the most deceitful and infertile tracts, so that you can only
find fault with one kind of land by comparing it with a better kind. So you ascend through all the grades of land
with their varying praiseworthy qualities, and when you find the very best land
you are glad that there are other kinds as well (On Free Will III.v.13).
Thus in order to think of evil
properly, it is important to “keep the totality in view” (Conf. VII.13.19).
Fallen humans tend to evaluate good and evil from an ad nostrum point of
view; that is, “If it is good for us, it is good, and if it is bad for us, it
is evil” (Brachtendorf 88-9, cf. City of God XI.22). But when one adopts
a God’s eye view of creation, one sees that the whole is greater than the sum
of its parts, and even the lowliest part is not without value for the
contribution it makes to the glory of what ranks ahead of it.
Augustine assumes a hierarchical
universe in which things that manifest a more complex unity are greater than
things that manifest a simpler unity.
For instance, mice, which are a living unity of body and mind, are
greater than bread, which is an inanimate object. Ad nostrum, we would greatly prefer
bread in our cupboard to mice, but “a more wholesome judgment” (Conf. VII.14.20)
would assign the greater glory to mice (Brachtendorf 88-9).
Thus there is a strong aesthetic
dimension to Augustine’s theodicy. Just
as the color black, in the hands of a skilled artist can contribute to a
masterpiece, those things which humans experience as evil are, in fact,
subordinated to the greater glory of the whole according to the creative will
of God.
In his essay “Insubstantial Evil,” Rowan
Williams argues that Augustine does not present an aesthetic of evil. The
statement, “For you evil has no being at all” (Conf. VII.13.19) does not
imply a point of view, writes Williams, but only that “unlike us, God is not
tempted to short-circuit the argument and ascribe to evil a substantive life it
does not and cannot have” (Williams 107). Yet Augustine’s own words about
“keeping the totality in view,” his accusation in City of God XI.22 that
an ad nostrum point of view leads directly to the Manichean heresy, and
his treatise On Order belie Williams’ assertion that Augustine’s
theodicy does not contain an aesthetic element. In the latter, Augustine’s
conversation partner Trygetius acquits Divine Providence of responsibility for
evil, but faults the human inability to survey the totality of creation (Sohn
49).
One last issue remains, the origin
of this vitiation of the good and imbalance in the created order called
evil. Augustine, one will recall, locates
evil internally, in the free choice of the human will to turn from the
good. Because evil is insubstantial, the
human will is not evil by nature, but defective. What was left unanswered was what accounted
for this turning away. In City of God
XII Augustine picks up the trail and follows it back in salvation history as
far as he can. Before God created human beings God created the angels. Angels are rational, spiritual beings with a
will, and theirs’ has to be a good will because all created things, to the
extent that they exist, are good. But
some of these angels, of their own free will, turned away from God and in on themselves
in haughty self-regard. These wicked angels, in turn, tempted the first humans
to sin, and Adam and Eve, of their own free will, gave into temptation. Since
“all sinned in Adam,” there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as natural
evil. There are only evils that rebuke sinners and teach the elect to hope in a
better world to come.
What caused the will to choose such
a thing? This is a useless question (Maker
156):
Augustine.—Since
will is the cause of sin, you now ask what is the cause of the will. If I could
find one, are you not going to ask for the cause of the cause I have found?
What limit will there be to your quest, what end to inquiry and explanation?
You ought not to push your inquiry deeper… An evil will, therefore, is the
cause of all evils” (On Free Will III.xv.48).
Another way Augustine puts it is
that there is no efficient cause of the will’s turning from God, only a
deficient cause (City of God XII.7). The buck stops with the will. Now
there may be some inherent instability in the will. Though created good, it is
created ex nihilo, and prone to return to nothingness through the
privation of falling away from the good (City of God XIV.13). Nonetheless,
we are left with something of a mystery as to that first turning of the will
away from God. Or are we? In contrasting the good and evil angels Augustine
writes,
Those other
angels were created good but have become evil by their own bad will; and this
bad will did not originate from their nature, which was good. It came through a
voluntary falling away from good, so that evil is caused not by good, but by
falling away from good. Either they received less grace of the divine love than
did the others, who continued in that grace; or, if both were created equally
good, the one sort fell through their own evil will, while the others had
greater help to enable them to attain to the fullness of bliss with the
complete assurance that they will never fall away (City of God XII.9)
The consensus in the seminar was
that Augustine raised the first option, only to dismiss it in favor of the
second, and that the phrase “while others had greater help…” refers to the gift
of perseverance given to the good angels as a reward for their obedience. But
Babcock reads it differently:
In the end,
then, Augustine does propose—perhaps as a bulwark against the intimation that
the fall of the evil angels was a matter or sheer chance?—a differentiation
between the two groups of angels, the evil and the good… The critical point of
distinction between the two groups of angels turns out ultimately to rest in an
external factor, something that God has given to the one but not to the other…
To the inexplicable conundrum of the good will’s unprompted turn from God to
self, then, Augustine has added the inexplicable mystery of a God who, for no
apparent reason, gives aid to some and withholds aid from other angels… [I]t is
in relation to the angelic fall that Augustine explicitly addresses the
question of the origin of the evil will, and here, despite his best efforts,
his analysis swivels between a position that, in effect, reduces evil to a
random outcome… and a position that... makes the first evil will a function of
God’s withholding aid
(106-7).
Babcock’s analysis points the way
toward a darker theodicy that can be argued for based on Augustine’s theology. Perhaps
God willed the angelic fall and consequent human fall in order that a fallen
creation would result. Indeed, Augustine pronounces this present miserable
creation “perfect” (On Free Will III.ix.26), not only from the point of view
of a God who can see in an instant how the inferior creatures glorify the
superior, and not only in light of the future glory awaiting the suffering saints,
but also in light of the present miseries for sinners justly punished. A
pre-lapsarian world could not have manifested the good of the punishment of sin.
In the Supralapsarian belief that
God damns some for God’s own glory, and in all theodicies, both amateur and
professional, that appeal to God’s sovereign will to pre-empt hard questions
about the goodness of God and the reality of evil, Augustine’s immaterial
Creator becomes something of a mad artist who is enthralled with his project to
the point of indifference to the pain and suffering of the creatures on the
canvas. Perhaps for this reason Williams wants to deny, despite much evidence
to the contrary, the aesthetic dimension of Augustine’s doctrine of evil.
Yet Augustine denies that sins or
misery are necessary to the perfection of the universe (On Free Will
III.ix.26). There is neither aesthetic
necessity nor moral necessity of evil in the beautiful chain of being (Sohn
52). There is a God who makes all things work together for good for those who
love him (Romans 8:28), who judged it better to bring good out of evil, than to
not permit evil to exist (Sohn 52).
Works Cited
Augustine. City of God XII. London:
Penguin Books, 1972.
. The Confessions. Hyde Park NY: New
City Press, 1997.
.
“On Free Will.” Augustine: Earlier Writings. John H.S. Burleigh, ed.
Philadelphia: The Westminster Press,
1953.
.
Teaching Christianity. Hyde Park NY: New City Press, 1996.
Babcock,
William S. “Augustine on Sin and Moral
Agency.” The Ethics of St. Augustine.
Atlanta: Scholars Press. 87-113.
Brachtendorf,
Johannes. “The Goodness of Creation and the Reality of Evil: Suffering As a
Problem in Augustine’s Theodicy.” Augustinian
Studies 31.1 (2000) 79-92.
Coyle,
John Kevin. “God’s Place in Augustine’s Anti-Manichaean Polemic.” Augustinian
Studies
38.1 (2007). 87-102.
Cress,
D.A. “Augustine’s Privation Account of Evil: A Defense.” Augustinian Studies
20
(1989). 109-128.
Maker,
William. “Augustine on evil: the
dilemma of the philosophers.” International Journal
for Philosophy of Religion
15.3 (1984). 149-160.
Plotinus. The Enneads. New York: Pantheon Books,
1969.
Sohn,
Hohyun. “The Beauty of Hell? Augustine’s Aesthetic Theodicy and Its
Critics.”
Theology Today 64. 47-57.
Williams,
Rowan. “Insubstantial Evil.” Augustine and His Critics. Dodaro &
Lawless, eds.
London: Routledge. 105-123.
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