I'm nearly finished with Gershom Gorenberg's The Accidental Empire, a fascinating history of how the West Bank and Gaza Strip came to be dotted with Jewish settlements in the aftermath of the Six Day War. As the title implies, the Gordian Knot both sides find themselves in wasn't tied by a formal government decree. The government never developed a strategy for the land or its Palestinian residents. Individual Israelis, private citizens, government officials and military officers, thinking that "It's easier to ask for forgiveness than permission," filled the policy void with brick and mortar. Lacking an overarching strategy, the government found it increasingly difficult to say No to the settlements. As Goremberg observes, even governments usually have to have better reasons than "Because I said so."
Many factors contributed to Israeli policy paralysis. When a week's worth of fighting left Israel controlling twice as much real estate, and a whole lot of Arabs, no one was more surprised and flummoxed than the government. The newly acquired land offered Israeli access to biblical sites and a buffer against Arab tanks. But in the long run it threatened to undermine the Jewish majority in lands under Israeli administration.
It's interesting to view the recent fury over Jimmy Carter's book about the West Bank and Gaza, the mere title of which provoked such consternation, in light of Gorenberg's history. In the late 1960s Israeli government officials themselves were comparing their control of the West Bank and Gaza to an equally odious African regime: Rhodesia.
So what do you do when the dowry's nice (the land), but you aren't so sure about the bride (the Palestinians)? For every cabinet minister there was a plan. The Labor governments of Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir could never find consensus. Nor did they particularly want to. Why risk the government falling? And with their American patrons preoccupied with Vietnam, there was no external pressure to do so.
Zionist pioneers came to Palestine under Turkish and British rule, often in defiance of immigration policy, to establish facts. Living, breathing Jewish settlements in the Holy Land would eventually necessitate international recognition of a Jewish state. These immigrants were secular, even atheistic, often communistic and anarchistic in their creation of the kibbutzim, the communal farms where even the children were raised collectively.
The '67 war gave the Zionist pioneer spirit new life. Yet the kibbutzim did not yield up its children to establish new outposts in the Occupied Territories. It fell to Orthodox Jews, many of whom had been skeptical of Zionism, to fill the land, and the policy void. In a time in which the New Left was rising in democracies everywhere, made up of the comfortable children of "the greatest generation" with something to prove, in Israel a New Right arose. They too had something to prove. Their absorption of Zionist nationalism, or rather, the sacralizing of Zionism, is a major and fascinating theme of the book.
So the pattern was repeated. Only this time the facts were being established in defiance of Jewish governors, rather than Brits or Turks. "Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice," and flouting the rule of law in the name of the people who live under it was a noble task, one that neither the State nor public opinion had the will to say No to.
Oddly enough, the disastrous Yom Kippur War gave the Settler Movement a boost. Possessing the territories, it turned out, was not a sufficient buffer against Arab aggression. And the settlements didn't help but hurt the war effort, for they had to be evacuated under enemy fire. And confidence that the Messianic age was near, fed by the overwhelming success of the Six Day War, would seem to wither in the face of heavy casualties and a partial Israeli pullback in the Sinai.
But Gorenberg observes that various apocalyptic movements have reconstituted themselves in the face of even worse evidence to the contrary. Doubt chases certainty. In the case of the religious Zionist settlers, it chased them up into the hills around the Palestinian cities of Nablus and Jenin. And they're there to this day, like Jacob and Esau struggling together in the womb.
Gorenberg writes well. He tells a story of war, bureaucratic inertia and diplomatic intrigue through compelling biographical sketches:
- Moshe Dayan, the general and cabinet minister who liked to plunder women almost as much as he liked to plunder archaeological sites;
- Eshkol, the PM, of so many minds on the issue that Goremberg likens him to a walking parliament;
- the melancholy writer and '67 vet Amos Oz, opposed to the settlements;
- the wrathfully reactionary Golda Meir, and many others.
The book offers no predictions of a blueprint for the future, but it's invaluable as an information source for how we got into this mess we're in.
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